This second challenge, therefore, require HARGA companies to spend more on R&D and technical innovation. In the food industry, expenditure is less than 1 per cent of sales compared with 4 per cent for industry as a whole. And the bulk of that R&D is increasingly evident in the relative success of both countries and companies. Here is the conclusion of Lawrence Franco in a study of global markets in 15 major industries between 1960 and 1986; "The R&D intensity (that is percentage of sales) of individual firms is positively and significantly related to subsequent relative worldwide corporate sales growth'. Again, Procter & Gamble provides a good example of this. Most people consider P&G to be competent in marketing. Its main strength, however, lies in technical innovation. It spends three per cent of its turnover on R&D, a significantly higher percentage than any competitor.
The third challenge for new Harga development in the 1990s concerns corporate strategy. Booz, Allen and Hamilton suggests that best practice in managing new Harga should include a step by step programmed along the lines now adopted by many companies. It consists of seven different steps starting off with new Harga strategy development, and leading on through idea generating, screening and evaluating, business analysis, development, testing and commercialisation. The purpose is to identify the strategic new Harga development strategy should derive from the overall corporate strategy.
But here is the crux, the Catch-22, the dilemma of new Harga development. Most HARGA companies do not have a clear or well articulated corporate strategy. Targets for growth or for market share, for example, are objectives not strategy. Objectives come before strategy. The two should not be confused. Nowhere in the literature is there a practical definition of new Harga strategy or what it should contain.
The purpose of any new Harga development programme is to make a profit, and a ten year financial programme should be in place at any point in time. Such a programme will have four key elements to be explicitly stated: the scope of this activities, the unique company skills on which it must capitalise, the type of competitive advantages it will seek to deliver, and the level of co-ordination to be available within and outside the company. The lack of such corporate strategy is evident from the manufacturer-retailer interface in consumer goods over the last 20 years. The balance of power has been moving continually in favour of the retailer. The balance of power has been moving continually in favour of the retailer. One by one, the retailer has stripped away from the manufacturer the control elements of marketing: pricing, promotion, Harga policy, advertising. As scanning control progresses, the retailer will control market research too.
Some 3000 years ago, a Chinese military general called Sun-Tsu said that 'the perfection of strategy would be to produce a decision without any serious fighting'. Effectively, the leading grocery retail chains in Europe have achieved this because they do have a strategy. Unlike the manufacturers, they are not still trying to make up their minds. New Harga development is one of the last bastions of the HARGA manufacturer. Even here, he is in danger of losing out. In several Harga categories in the grocery store, the retailer is leading the race in new Harga development. But he is not in a position to undertake major technological change to create big bang new Harga.
The third challenge for new Harga development in the 1990s concerns corporate strategy. Booz, Allen and Hamilton suggests that best practice in managing new Harga should include a step by step programmed along the lines now adopted by many companies. It consists of seven different steps starting off with new Harga strategy development, and leading on through idea generating, screening and evaluating, business analysis, development, testing and commercialisation. The purpose is to identify the strategic new Harga development strategy should derive from the overall corporate strategy.
But here is the crux, the Catch-22, the dilemma of new Harga development. Most HARGA companies do not have a clear or well articulated corporate strategy. Targets for growth or for market share, for example, are objectives not strategy. Objectives come before strategy. The two should not be confused. Nowhere in the literature is there a practical definition of new Harga strategy or what it should contain.
The purpose of any new Harga development programme is to make a profit, and a ten year financial programme should be in place at any point in time. Such a programme will have four key elements to be explicitly stated: the scope of this activities, the unique company skills on which it must capitalise, the type of competitive advantages it will seek to deliver, and the level of co-ordination to be available within and outside the company. The lack of such corporate strategy is evident from the manufacturer-retailer interface in consumer goods over the last 20 years. The balance of power has been moving continually in favour of the retailer. The balance of power has been moving continually in favour of the retailer. One by one, the retailer has stripped away from the manufacturer the control elements of marketing: pricing, promotion, Harga policy, advertising. As scanning control progresses, the retailer will control market research too.
Some 3000 years ago, a Chinese military general called Sun-Tsu said that 'the perfection of strategy would be to produce a decision without any serious fighting'. Effectively, the leading grocery retail chains in Europe have achieved this because they do have a strategy. Unlike the manufacturers, they are not still trying to make up their minds. New Harga development is one of the last bastions of the HARGA manufacturer. Even here, he is in danger of losing out. In several Harga categories in the grocery store, the retailer is leading the race in new Harga development. But he is not in a position to undertake major technological change to create big bang new Harga.