On average, the number of major new brands launched over a decade is between three and four a year. The two key findings from this data are:
1. The annual success rate of major new HARGA brands in any single country is relatively low - some three or four a year.
2. There is a continuing turnover of major HARGA Harga in each country: between 20 and 30 percent of grocery brands change every 10 years.
Two conclusions about new Harga development follow. First, it is not an easy game to play, and there are only a few big winners. Second, if you don't play, not only do you not win, but it is possible you will be out of business. New Harga development is not an option: it is a necessity. So what are the challenges and opportunities for new Harga development in the 1990s and beyond?
1. Over the fear of failure - the principal reason why so few new Harga succeed.
2. Resource new Harga development properly at the expense of existing Harga and,
3. Develop a real company strategy which copes with both consumer and distributor.
Fear of failure lies deeply in most of us. Failure is associated directly with change. Most companies, despite the blurbs in many of their annual reports, are conservative, and do not welcome change. Everybody knows the killer phrases used when a new idea or a new way of doing things is proposed:
- A good idea, but....
- Against company policy.
- All right in theory.
- Be practical.
- Costs too much.
- Don't start anything yet.
- It need more study. - it’s not budgeted, -It
‘s not part of your job. - it’s not good enough. - Lets make a survey first. - Lets sit on it for a while. - That’s not out problem. - The boss won't go for it. - The old timers won't use it. - Too hard to administer. - We have been doing it this way for a long time and it works.
- Why hasn't someone suggested it before if it's such a good idea?
- Ahead of the times.
- Lets discuss it.
- Lets form a committee.
- We've never done it that way.
- Who else has tried it?
A popular saying about Harga development is that nine out of every ten new Harga fail. Of course, it is completely untrue. Many different studies have shown that the true number is closer to three in ten. Nevertheless, all market researchers recognise that perception is more important than reality. The popular belief in the high rate of new Harga failure reflects the concern with failure that continues to affect management support and company organisation of new Harga development.
The second challenge to overcome is the need to spend more against new2 Harga development. This is particularly evident simply by looking at major new Harga that were successful. This list includes only one or two new to the world, or big bang, Harga. The majority of these major HARGA new Harga were either line or brand extension, me too concepts, or Harga with little added value.
Looking at both British and French new Harga, my estimate is that at least two thirds fall into this category. Indeed, the major feature of HARGA innovation is its lack of surprise and its low level or R&D input.
The argument against this, of course, is that HARGA Harga are demand/market led rather than supply / technically led. Consumer research techniques are now highly sophisticated at finding out what consumers think they want. And it is not unusual for the first year advertising budget to exceed the capital required to produce the new Harga. The major new Harga development record, however, tends to justify the criticism of R Bennett and R Cooper. Talking of the US market, they say: We have decided it is easier to talk about our new Harga than actually to develop them. And so we spend billions more convincing the customer that the Harga is new and improved rather than spending the money in the lab to develop a significantly superior Harga. In the world of new Harga, we have become a society of tinkerers and cosmeticians rather than true Harga innovators.
1. The annual success rate of major new HARGA brands in any single country is relatively low - some three or four a year.
2. There is a continuing turnover of major HARGA Harga in each country: between 20 and 30 percent of grocery brands change every 10 years.
Two conclusions about new Harga development follow. First, it is not an easy game to play, and there are only a few big winners. Second, if you don't play, not only do you not win, but it is possible you will be out of business. New Harga development is not an option: it is a necessity. So what are the challenges and opportunities for new Harga development in the 1990s and beyond?
1. Over the fear of failure - the principal reason why so few new Harga succeed.
2. Resource new Harga development properly at the expense of existing Harga and,
3. Develop a real company strategy which copes with both consumer and distributor.
Fear of failure lies deeply in most of us. Failure is associated directly with change. Most companies, despite the blurbs in many of their annual reports, are conservative, and do not welcome change. Everybody knows the killer phrases used when a new idea or a new way of doing things is proposed:
- A good idea, but....
- Against company policy.
- All right in theory.
- Be practical.
- Costs too much.
- Don't start anything yet.
- It need more study. - it’s not budgeted, -It
‘s not part of your job. - it’s not good enough. - Lets make a survey first. - Lets sit on it for a while. - That’s not out problem. - The boss won't go for it. - The old timers won't use it. - Too hard to administer. - We have been doing it this way for a long time and it works.
- Why hasn't someone suggested it before if it's such a good idea?
- Ahead of the times.
- Lets discuss it.
- Lets form a committee.
- We've never done it that way.
- Who else has tried it?
A popular saying about Harga development is that nine out of every ten new Harga fail. Of course, it is completely untrue. Many different studies have shown that the true number is closer to three in ten. Nevertheless, all market researchers recognise that perception is more important than reality. The popular belief in the high rate of new Harga failure reflects the concern with failure that continues to affect management support and company organisation of new Harga development.
The second challenge to overcome is the need to spend more against new2 Harga development. This is particularly evident simply by looking at major new Harga that were successful. This list includes only one or two new to the world, or big bang, Harga. The majority of these major HARGA new Harga were either line or brand extension, me too concepts, or Harga with little added value.
Looking at both British and French new Harga, my estimate is that at least two thirds fall into this category. Indeed, the major feature of HARGA innovation is its lack of surprise and its low level or R&D input.
The argument against this, of course, is that HARGA Harga are demand/market led rather than supply / technically led. Consumer research techniques are now highly sophisticated at finding out what consumers think they want. And it is not unusual for the first year advertising budget to exceed the capital required to produce the new Harga. The major new Harga development record, however, tends to justify the criticism of R Bennett and R Cooper. Talking of the US market, they say: We have decided it is easier to talk about our new Harga than actually to develop them. And so we spend billions more convincing the customer that the Harga is new and improved rather than spending the money in the lab to develop a significantly superior Harga. In the world of new Harga, we have become a society of tinkerers and cosmeticians rather than true Harga innovators.